KGP-001 · 10 AUGUST 2026

Permission infrastructure for physical AI.

A narrow, open authorization and accountability layer for machines that act in the real world.

Status Experimental draftImplementation Apache-2.0Safety path Local, fail closed

01 / ABSTRACT

Machines can act. They still need a common way to prove they were allowed.

Physical-AI systems cross boundaries between people, spaces, devices, and organizations. KineGrant connects existing identity, policy, device, and robotics systems at one decisive point: immediately before a physical action.

KineGrant is not a robot operating system, motion planner, functional-safety controller, identity registry, blockchain, token, or legal authority.
01Request
02Policy
03Capability
04Gate
05Receipt

02 / CORE OBJECTS

Five objects, one enforceable path.

01

ActionRequest

A normalized request binding an authenticated agent to a target, action, purpose, time, and policy-visible context.

02

PolicyRule

An allow or deny rule with issuer, scope, constraints, and obligations. Unknown policy never becomes permission.

03

Decision

The deterministic result of evaluating a request against all applicable policy with deny-overrides semantics.

04

Capability

A short-lived Ed25519-signed permission bound to the request and policy digests, with a random one-time nonce.

05

Receipt

A signed, privacy-minimized record of the attempted outcome, optionally chained to the previous receipt.

03 / DECISION SEMANTICS

Safe, deterministic, deliberately conservative.

An implementation rejects a request when no applicable allow exists, when any applicable deny exists, or when a required constraint cannot be interpreted.

  1. 01

    Normalize and validate the action request.

  2. 02

    Resolve authenticated policy sources and trusted issuers.

  3. 03

    Collect every applicable allow and deny rule.

  4. 04

    Apply deny-overrides and default-deny semantics.

  5. 05

    Issue a short-lived capability only after an allowed decision.

  6. 06

    Verify signature, scope, expiry, and nonce locally at the actuator gate.

  7. 07

    Consume the capability once and emit a signed receipt.

04 / SECURITY MODEL

A signature is necessary. It is not physical truth.

Draft 0.1 uses Ed25519 signatures, authenticated policy issuers, trusted-clock request freshness, request binding, one-to-300-second capability lifetimes, and atomic one-time replay protection. Implementation v0.1.1 includes a crash-persistent SQLite replay store; production deployments still require hardware-backed keys, local revocation, and an independent functional-safety controller.

Do not deploy draft 0.1 as the sole control for hazardous machinery. Independent cryptographic, robotics-safety, and privacy review is required.

05 / INTEROPERABILITY

Standards remain authoritative at their boundaries.

SourceReused conceptKineGrant boundary
W3C ODRL 2.2permission, prohibition, dutyconservative PolicyRule profile
IEEE 7012-2025machine-readable privacy termsexperimental privacy bridge
W3C WoT TDthing identity and actionstarget and action discovery
ROS 2 / SROS2robot identity and middleware ACLphysical request adapter
OPC UAnodes, methods, and rolesmethod-to-target adapter
Matterfabric, endpoint, cluster, commandcommand request adapter

Native platform authorization AND a valid KineGrant capability AND the local safety controller must all allow. Any layer may veto; no layer may force another to permit.

06 / STATUS AND PARTICIPATION

Review the threat model before the marketing.

KGP-001 is an experimental open draft, not a recognized standard or safety certification. The reference implementation is designed to make the semantics testable and challengeable.

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